This has the advantage of maintaining a semblance of coherency and consistency across private law: the law of property and trusts is not an entirely different species from contract and tort. 21 Nevertheless, there appears to be some feeling that certainty is especially important in the context of property rights. The Law Commission was acutely conscious of many responses to its consultations which emphasised the need for certainty in the context of property rights, 22 and the Draft Bill it ultimately attached to its final report was very narrow in scope and covered only equitable property rights but not legal property rights. The reliance principle in Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd 23 would therefore have been maintained. Admittedly, the Commission thought this was a source of 'regret', but the different considerations at issue -particularly as regards third parties -when considering property rights mean that it is unlikely that Patel v Mirza will be the final word on illegality in property law. Indeed, when downplaying fears of uncertainty, Lord Toulson pointed out that 'people contemplating unlawful activity' do not perhaps 'deserve' that the law be entirely certain; 24 but where the claim in a trust dispute concerns third parties, such reasoning is obviously weakened. As Lord Neuberger rightly observed, innocent third parties are entitled to expect the law to be clear, and "there is a general public interest in certainty and clarity in all areas of law".
25

II. The Role and Future of the Presumption of Advancement
The decision in Tinsley highlighted the importance of the two so-called 'presumptions' of resulting trust and advancement. Equity is generally said to be suspicious of transfers made for no consideration in return, so a donee may hold the property transferred on trust for the donor by virtue of a 'presumption of resulting trust'. In some circumstances, however, equity will presume that a gift was intended because of the relationship between the parties, as a result of a 'presumption of advancement'. The effect of these different presumptions relates to the allocation of the burden of proof: 26 where the presumption of resulting trust arises, the burden will be on the transferee to show that a trust was not intended, and where the presumption of advancement applies, the burden will be on the transferor to show that he or she did not intend a gift but intended to retain a beneficial interest in the property.
In Stack v Dowden, 27 Baroness Hale cited with approval the observation of Lord Diplock in Pettitt v Pettitt that the equitable presumptions are 'no more than a consensus of judicial opinion disclosed by reported cases as to the most likely inference of fact to be drawn in the absence of any evidence to the contrary'. 28 However, it is worth highlighting that the existence of two competing 'presumptions' is controversial. Logically, only one is needed. So, for example, we may only need a presumption of resulting trust, and where this does not apply there is no need for any fact to be presumed and therefore no need for any 'presumption' of advancement. 29 Nevertheless, the language of two different presumptions is entrenched in the decided cases and was raised to undue prominence by the House of Lords in Tinsley. Miss Tinsley and Miss Milligan were lovers who purchased a property which was conveyed into the sole name of Tinsley, even though Milligan had contributed to the purchase price. The purpose of this arrangement was to defraud the Department of Social Security. Milligan claimed a share in the property, and Tinsley argued that she could not do so because of her illegal conduct. A bare majority of the House of Lords held that Milligan could claim a share in the house despite the illegal purpose of the arrangement. Milligan could rely on the presumed resulting trust which arose in her favour by virtue of her contribution to the purchase price:
30 she did not need to lead any evidence of illegality in order to establish her beneficial interest, and Tinsley could not rebut the presumption of resulting trust by relying on the illegal purpose of the arrangement. However, on only slightly different facts the result would have been entirely different. If the case had concerned a married heterosexual couple, and the husband had contributed to the purchase of a house in the sole name of his wife, then there would have been a presumption of advancement in favour of his wife, rather than a presumption of resulting trust. Consequently, the husband would not have been able to claim a share in the property: he would have needed to lead evidence of illegality in order to rebut the presumption of advancement, and this would not be permitted. Yet the merits of the two cases appear overwhelmingly similar.
This highlights that the two presumptions 'are not as innocuous as they seem'. 31 The relationship between the parties could be crucial in determining whether a trust prima facie arises, and whether there is any need to rely upon illegal conduct. This was highlighted in Tribe v Tribe. 32 A father transferred shares to his son to conceal them from his creditors. Once the threat from his creditors had passed, the father asked his son to return the shares to him. The son refused and argued that, since there had been an apparent gift from father to son, the presumption of advancement applied and the father was unable to rebut this by pleading his actual unlawful purpose. The Court of Appeal held that, since none of the creditors had been aware of the transfer of shares, no part of the illegal purpose had been carried into effect, so the father could withdraw from the illegal scheme as he was still within the 'locus poenitentiae'; the father could therefore plead his illegal intent in order to rebut the presumption of advancement. This reliance on the locus poenitentiae is controversial, since it appears that the illegal purpose of the father had been carried out, as his shares were hidden with his son for a given period, exactly as intended. 33 The decision in courts to get the best of both worlds -to achieve his fraudulent purpose and also to get his property back'.
34
Following Patel v Mirza it may now be that there is no need to invoke a locus poenitentiae since the balancing approach necessarily takes into account whether the illegal purpose has been fulfilled.
35 But Tribe highlights a certain level of dissatisfaction with the rigid approach in Tinsley. Millett LJ criticised the 'harshness' of the decision in Tinsley, 36 and Nourse LJ cited with apparent approval the criticism of HHJ Weekes QC at first instance in the case, who found it 'difficult to see why the outcome in cases such as the present one should depend to such a large extent on arbitrary factors, such as whether the claim is brought by a father against a son, or a mother against a son, or a grandfather against a grandson'. 37 More recently, Black J has lamented that 'the courts have plainly felt uncomfortable at times with the results of the rules, which can seem sometimes to favour one of a number of parties who are all equally implicated in the illegal purpose simply by virtue of the accident of how a case has to be pleaded, but that is the way in which the law operates'.
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Much of the dissatisfaction stems from whether the presumption of advancement or presumption of resulting trust arises from the facts of the case. And it is in the context of illegal transactions that the presumptions are most important: both the presumption of advancement and the presumption of resulting trust can be displaced by any evidence of a contrary intention, 39 but the major restriction was that evidence tainted by illegality was not admissible under the 'reliance principle' of Tinsley. As a result, the Law Commission understandably considered whether the presumption of advancement could simply be abolished, 40 and whether this would solve many of the problems posed for the law of trusts by Tinsley. Although this proposal apparently received the support of consultees, this limited idea of reform was soon dropped by the Law Commission since it would only affect resulting trusts. Yet the fact-pattern of Tinsley itself would no longer be considered to concern a resulting trust, but rather a constructive trust, following the decisions of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden 41 and Jones v Kernott.
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Beyond the context of illegality, the presumption of advancement has continued to be attacked. In its traditional form, it is easy to criticise this presumption as anachronistic and discriminatory. In Tinsley v Milligan, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that it applied to 'a transfer from a man to his wife, children or others to whom he stands in loco parentis '. 43 But why should it matter whether the transferor was male or female? The basis of the presumption appears to be that women and children depended upon a patriarch such that the advantage of a presumption of advancement was required as a matter of public policy. However, as Lord Reid commented in Pettitt v Pettitt as long ago as 1969, 'These considerations have largely lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost all flexibility so that the courts can no longer adapt it to changing conditions, the strength of the presumption must have been much diminished'. 44 It has also been said that existence of the presumption of advancement is contrary to human rights, 45 although the better view is that the presumption of advancement in itself is probably not contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. 46 In any event, distinguishing between gifts on the basis that they were made by a man or by a woman is clearly unsatisfactory. There are two principal options for future reform: either abolish the presumption of advancement, or extend it so that it also applies to transfers from wife to husband and mother to child, for example. The first option was adopted in section 199 of the Equality Act 2010. Yet despite much of the Equality Act 2010 already being implemented, section 199 has not been brought into force, and there are no indications that the Government intends to do so. It is suggested that one consequence of Patel v Mirza will be that section 199 of the Equality Act 2010 is even less likely to be implemented, since any perceived need to do so will be reduced now that cases on illegality no longer turn upon whether the presumption of advancement applies.
Judicial proclamations that the presumption of advancement is on its 'death-bed' 47 are therefore likely to prove premature. More to the point is Lord Neuberger's observation in Stack v Dowden that 'the presumption of advancement, as between man and wife, which was so important in the 18th and 19th centuries, has now become much weakened, although not quite to the point of disappearance'. 48 Indeed, it is possible to imagine that the presumption might conceivably have some role to play beyond illegal transactions. For instance, a father might transfer property to his son immediately before becoming mentally incapacitated or dying, and it may be important to ascertain where the burden of proof lies. It is suggested that there is much to be said in favour of retaining the presumption of advancement. After all, when a father gives property to his child, it seems more likely than not that a gift was intended, and that the burden should be on the father to prove the contrary. It is to be hoped that the presumption will simply be extended to cover gifts from mother to child 49 and from wife to husband 50 or between spouses in a same-sex marriage. This path is available to judges when developing the common law. It is doubtful whether the contrary approach of abolishing the presumption of advancement 44 Pettitt (n 39) 793. 45 48 Stack v Dowden (n 27) [101] . 49 should be pursued by judges when Government has deliberately chosen not to bring such a reform into effect through section 199.
There is some evidence that the courts have already started to shift in the direction of expanding the presumption of advancement. In Antoni v Antoni, Lord Scott, giving the advice of the Privy Council, employed gender-neutral language in describing the presumption of advancement as applying 'when a parent places assets in the name of a child and assumes that the parent intends to make a gift to the child'. 51 Similarly, in Close Invoice Finance Ltd v Abaowa, Mr Simon Picken QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, said, obiter, that he 'would have had no hesitation in deciding that in the modern age the presumption of advancement should, indeed, be taken as applying between a mother and a daughter in the same way that it does as between a father and his child'. 52 It has been suggested this approach might come at an indirect cost to women, 53 and it may prove difficult to define precisely which relationships give rise to the presumption of advancement. Nevertheless, it remains the best avenue available to judges. The alternative option of abolishing the presumption can now only satisfactorily be achieved through legislation, and in many respects section 199 remains problematic. For example, that provision would operate prospectively only; 54 reform should be both immediate and have retrospective effect.
III. Implementing the work of the Law Commission?
It is clear that Lord Toulson and the majority of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza were influenced by the work of the Law Commission. 55 Given that Lord Toulson was the Chair of the Commission for part of the very long lifetime of the Law Commission's project, this is unsurprising. However, it is worth reflecting on the scope of the Law Commission's proposals compared to the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court. This is particularly appropriate in the context of trusts, since the Law Commission did recommend statutory reform, and indeed the final report of the Law Commission included a Draft Trusts (Concealment of Interests) Bill (Draft Bill).
Too much weight should not be placed upon the Law Commission's proposed legislation. After all, the Government said that it was 'minded not to implement the Commission's proposals', 56 and the Law Commission itself confessed to finding the project very difficult, and to divisions within the Commission. 57 It might be thought that the Law Commission did well just to rid itself of the project in the end, since, at least on one view, it had received something of a 'hospital pass' from Lord Goff in being made to look at such an intricate and complex area of law where opinions differ markedly and vociferously. It is not surprising that legislation has not been passed. But the Law Commission's project does have the great merit of clearly highlighting the major areas of difficulty in the common law, and it 57 See, eg, CP 154 (n 8) para 1.3; LC 320 (n 7) para 1.6. is interesting to consider to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved those difficulties, and how such problems might be confronted in the future.
The Draft Bill was only intended to apply 'if in the court's opinion the circumstances are exceptional'. 58 It is unclear what the terms 'exceptional' and 'circumstances' mean. The Law Commission thought that what constitutes 'exceptional circumstances' can be 'safely left to the courts ', 59 but that this extra hurdle of exceptional circumstances was necessary since 'in the general "run of the mill" type of case we do not expect the illegality to have any effect on the beneficiary's entitlement'. 60 However, if a beneficiary has taken steps to conceal an equitable interest for the purpose of committing a criminal offence -the only sort of situation to which the Draft Bill applies -this does not appear to be very 'run of the mill' at all. The Explanatory Notes to the Draft Bill indicate 'that the circumstances might be exceptional where, for example, the claimant's behaviour has been particularly reprehensible', 61 but this does not much further the quest for clarity.
The Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza did not endorse this 'gateway' of 'exceptionality'. This has the advantage of avoiding prolonged discussion about whether the facts of a particular case fall within the scope of a statutory regime. However, it is also clear from the decision in Patel v Mirza that it is only in a rare case that the illegality defence will affect the result in a case. 62 So although there is no formal barrier of 'exceptionality' to applying the balancing approach in Patel v Mirza, it is likely that it is only in situations where the illegality is very serious that a beneficiary would be unable to enforce his or her interests under a trust.
The Draft Bill, as its name suggests, was only intended to apply to instances of concealment.
63 If a trust was set up in order to conceal a beneficiary's interest in the property, and this was done in connection with the commission of an offence, then the statutory scheme would bite. 64 The proposed legislation also covered situations where a trust was established for proper purposes, but was later deliberately continued in order to conceal a beneficial interest in connection with the commission of an offence, and this was exploited by one of the parties. 65 The decision in Patel v Mirza covers such situations. However, that decision is not as limited as the proposed statutory discretion. For example, cases where the trust is executed in return for consideration which is illegal, 66 or where the relevant illegality is the source of the trust property, rather than the purpose of the trust arrangement, 67 would have remained outside the scope of the statutory regime, but appear to be subject to the "new" approach to illegal transactions endorsed by the Supreme Court. This might be especially welcome in cases where the relevant illegality is particularly serious.
Indeed, the Law Commission's very restrictive statutory regime would have left many property law cases outside its favoured approach, and created a divide between legal property rights and equitable property rights. 68 That this unfortunate consequence has been avoided is most welcome. 69 Moreover, the judicial approach promoted in Patel v Mirza can clearly be trumped by legislation which already provides that a transaction should be void, in which case there should be no balancing of factors at all. 70 And if the trust requires a beneficiary to commit an unlawful act, for example, then the trust should also still be void. 71 In any event, general principles of severance may still apply, such that an illegal and void provision may be severed from the other terms of the trust, such that the remainder of the trust can be enforced in the usual way.
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IV. Illegality and Third Parties
The Law Commission struggled to be clear about what the effect of illegality should be upon third parties to the trust. There are two main areas to consider here. First, what about claimants who are not the tainted beneficiaries, but instead the beneficiaries' creditors 73 or executors, 74 for example? And secondly, what about the position of third parties who are the innocent victims of the illegality?
As regards the first scenario, the Law Commission accepted that 'the position is simply not clear'. 75 In Collier v Collier, Mance LJ thought that the illegality defence might only bar the claim of a person tainted by the illegality, rather than an innocent creditor. 76 In a case such as Collier, where both the 'primary' parties to the trust were similarly tainted by the illegality, allowing a claim brought by an innocent third party creditor would seem to lead to the most sensible results. On the other hand, in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens 77 the House of Lords appeared to take the view that the creditor could be in no better position than the beneficiary through whom he claimed. This is understandable, but the status of Moore Stephens has been somewhat undermined by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir that Moore Stephens should no longer be relied upon. 78 Moreover, Moore Stephens might in any event be limited to cases brought on the basis of a breach of contractual or tortious duty of care. The more flexible approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza, and the desire to reach more transparently just outcomes, might suggest that the claims of an innocent creditor or executor should trump the claims of a defendant tainted by illegality. Indeed, given the support extended to Lord Browne-Wilkinson's view in Tinsley that the effect of illegality is procedural rather than substantive, 79 it seems possible for a court to say that whilst a beneficiary cannot personally enforce his or her rights due to the illegality defence, creditors or executors suing through the beneficiary may be able to.
This issue remains confused but important. It is to be hoped that guidance will soon be forthcoming. The Law Commission's Draft Bill explicitly provided that one factor to be taken into account should be that the intended 'victim' of the concealment may have an interest in the value of the assets of the beneficiary. 80 The Law Commission gave the example of a husband who may transfer property to his mistress in order to hide it from his wife. If a dispute were to arise between the husband and mistress over the ownership of the property, the court might take into account the possibility that the wife might in the future bring a claim against her husband under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and that the value of the wife's possible claim might be reduced if the court were to decide that the husband did not in fact have an interest under a trust in the property transferred to the mistress because of the illegality defence. This is a sensible approach, and it is to be hoped that it will be adopted by the courts.
As regards third party victims of the illegality, the Supreme Court refused to recognise any power in the courts to force a party to give up his or her illegal gains to the third party. That might have serious repercussions in a case such as Tinsley v Milligan. On the facts of that case, it appears that Milligan may have made peace with the Department for Social Security by paying back the benefits she fraudulently claimed. 81 But if she had not done so, and her claim were still not barred by the illegality defence due to the illegality being considered insufficiently serious, 82 then she would be able to retain the benefits she had fraudulently claimed. This would represent a windfall benefit (which would not be shared with Tinsley). Rather than allowing Milligan to assert her share in the property and retain the fraudulently claimed benefits, it may be preferable to allow Milligan to assert her share in the property only if she returned the benefits fraudulently claimed. That would be an available course of conduct in Australia following the decision of the High Court in Nelson v Nelson, 83 but this was described as a 'yet further novelty', 84 and the door was shut on this possibility in Patel v Mirza. 85 It is understandable why a court might feel uncomfortable arrogating to itself such an extensive power to make an order in favour of a third party not before the court. Indeed, the Law Commission also ultimately concluded that such a power would not be appropriate; after all, third party victims may choose to bring a claim in their own right, 86 and whether they do so or not is up to them and should not trouble a separate dispute before a court. 87 Yet the thrust of much of the reasoning in Patel v Mirza is to allow the courts to put the parties back into their original position before any illegality. 88 If this is taken seriously, and followed through to its logical conclusion, then illegally acquired benefits should be given up to innocent parties who have been deprived by the illegal conduct.
In many instances, the third party which might have standing to bring the claim will be the State. Indeed, it might be thought that an illegal act necessarily involves a wrong against the State.
89 In some circumstances, the State might seek to confiscate the proceeds of crime through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This legislative regime was understandably not considered by the Supreme Court, and there were no submissions made regarding it. 90 But why did the State not seek to confiscate the benefits illegally acquired in Patel v Mirza? The answer appears to have been previously recognised by the Law Commission: the National Crime Agency 'does not have sufficient resources to institute proceedings in every case in which property has been obtained through unlawful conduct'. 91 Admittedly, in the context of trust disputes the National Crime Agency's interest may often be piqued given the possibility of recovering tangible assets and sizeable sums, but it cannot be said with confidence that Lord Sumption was right to surmise that confiscation would be inevitable even as regards 'heinous crimes'. 92 The priorities and resources of the National Crime Agency determine whether a confiscation order is sought. It is suggested that the power of the courts to confiscate illegally acquired gains should be expanded. This is best achieved through statutory reform, given the limits already imposed by Parliament through the 2002 Act; 93 the reluctance of the Supreme Court squarely to confront this issue is therefore understandable. 94 Significantly, however, the Law Commission's Draft Bill contained provision for some minor amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in order to ensure that even where the court decides that the beneficiary should not be able to enforce his or her rights, there should be no adverse impact on the ability to recover the proceeds of crime. 95 One limitation of reforming the law through judicial decisions is the inability to tinker with other statutes. Yet the Law Commission's approach must be correct, and it is to be hoped that the courts somehow manage to arrive at the same outcome. 96 It is unclear how this can best be achieved. 97 There is, 87 LC 320 (n 7) para 2.84-2.85. However, if Miss Milligan's only asset was her interest in the house, but the court were to decide that her illegality was so serious that her claim should not be allowed to succeed, the Department of Social Security might have been deprived of any chance of seeking substantial relief from Miss Milligan. 88 Neuberger) . 97 Indeed, the importance of this point might suggest that the result in Patel v Mirza itself is unsatisfactory, since the money returned would probably have been amenable to confiscation had not restitution not been ordered.
after all, no guarantee that the claim for confiscation will be pursued before the trust dispute between the parties tainted by illegality, and a court cannot simply refuse to decide the latter issue or wait for any potential confiscation issue to be resolved. Perhaps the courts need to develop a novel order themselves, whereby, for example, the beneficiary is held to be unable to enforce his or her interest as a result of the illegality, but that interest can still be confiscated by the National Crime Agency.
V. The Consequences of Illegality
Given that Patel v Mirza is not a trusts case, it is unsurprising that the decision of the Supreme Court does not resolve what the consequences of an illegal transaction in the trust context might be. The general thrust of the reasoning in Patel might suggest that if a trust fails for illegality then the settlor should be able to claim the return of his or her property under a resulting trust. 98 This is likely to be sufficient in many cases, 99 but not in every situation. For instance, the settlor's illegality may be so serious that the court is sensibly reluctant to allow the settlor to recover the property. 100 As suggested above, in many circumstances the most attractive solution may be to confiscate the property which is the subject of the illegal transaction. Both the Law Commission and the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza considered that the civil courts should not effectively 'punish' parties in this way, 101 unless authorised to do so under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 102 It may nonetheless be possible for judges in some trust cases to achieve the same result by declaring that the property is bona vacantia such that it reverts to the State, but this remains an unlikely outcome: it is tantamount to confiscation, and property which has had an owner should not readily become ownerless.
In general, therefore, the court has four options when deciding who is entitled to the equitable interest, all of which were recognised in the Law Commission's Draft Bill: (i) the beneficiary; 103 (ii) the trustee; 104 (iii) the settlor; 105 or (iv) another beneficiary under the same trust.
Tinsley has been recognised as too inflexible, and that in some instances the court might have a discretion to split property between the settlor and beneficiary. 108 If the settlor has transferred property to be held on trust for him, but the illegal purposes(such as terrorism) are so severe that the illegality defence applies and prevents the settlor from recovering his property, then it is difficult to know what should happen to the property. The Law Commission thought that in such situations the court might declare that the trustee, as legal owner, should become beneficially entitled to the property in question.
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The Law Commission considered that this 'would appear to require a new statutory power to be given to the court', 110 and would be an available option for a court even where the purported 'trustee' did not counterclaim for any relief in his or her favour. It is unclear whether such a solution is desirable: after all, why should the trustee reap such a windfall gain, and why would this be better than confiscation of the illegal gains to the State? It may be that this option will now fade away if the view that it can only be made possible through legislation is supported, although it should be noted that in Q v Q there is perhaps some suggestion that this result can be reached even in the absence of legislation.
111 Similar concerns regarding undue windfalls surround the Law Commission's suggestion that the courts should be able to award the settlor's beneficial interest to 'any other beneficiary'. This looks like confiscating property and transferring it to a third party, and courts may reasonably be slow to do this without being empowered to do so by statute.
It also remains to be seen how the relationship between illegality and sham will be resolved in the trusts context. This is a difficult topic. Sham trusts are often established in order to effect an illegal purpose. Under the Draft Bill, the Law Commission's proposed scheme would have trumped any considerations of sham, and it may be that the more flexible approach favoured in Patel v Mirza will take priority over a more rigid approach towards sham trusts, especially as regards the relief available. Indeed, the consequence of finding that a trust is a sham appears to be that the trust is void; 112 a more nuanced approach to illegal transactions might be preferred.
It should perhaps also be noted that courts may need to clarify the position of a trustee of an 'illegal trust' who administers the trust as if it was valid, only later to find that the trust is invalid under the broader approach favoured by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. In principle, the trustee is likely to have committed a breach of trust. In appropriate cases it is to be expected that the trustee will be able to rely upon section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925 to be relieved from personal liability, 113 but guidance regarding when the trustee should be expected to seek the directions of the court would be helpful. It is suggested that it is only in instances of serious and obvious illegality that a court should refrain from granting relief under section 61 on the basis that the trustee ought to have sought the directions of the court. Similarly general principles should govern the liability of third parties who receive property conveyed to them by a trustee before a court decides that the trust is invalid for illegality: such third parties might be liable for knowing receipt 114 or subject to a proprietary claim for the property received.
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VI. Deciding Cases Differently
The approach of courts to problems of illegality will be very different under the guidance of Patel v Mirza than it has previously been under Tinsley v Milligan. However, the Law Commission noted that any earlier difficulties did not generally result in unsatisfactory outcomes on the facts of individual cases, and the criticism was focussed upon the way that those decisions were reached. 116 It can confidently be expected that many cases would be decided in exactly the same way even after Patel v Mirza. Indeed, in Patel v Mirza itself the divide between the judges as to the correct method of reasoning did not lead to any divergence in the outcome of the dispute.
In any event, the approach in Patel v Mirza is a clear break from earlier orthodoxy, and this appears to have been accepted by all members of the Supreme Court. In Tinsley v Milligan, Lord Goff noted that the traditional authorities left 'no room for the exercise of any discretion by the court in favour of one party or the other'. 117 The Court of Appeal in Tinsley v Milligan had employed a test of whether it would be 'an affront to the public conscience' to grant relief, 118 but Lord Goff held that that 'is little different, if at all, from stating that the court has a discretion whether to grant or refuse relief. It is very difficult to reconcile such a test with the principle of policy stated by Lord Mansfield CJ in Holman v Johnson … or with the established principles' going back over 200 years.
119
The majority approach in Patel v Mirza breaks away from the strictures of Tinsley v Milligan, and requires the balancing of a number of considerations. Lord Toulson concluded that 'The law should strive for the most desirable policy outcome, and it may be that it is best achieved by taking into account a range of factors'. 120 The crucial passage of Lord Toulson's judgment is worth setting out in full: 121 I would say that one cannot judge whether allowing a claim which is in some way tainted by illegality would be contrary to the public interest, because it would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system, without a) considering the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed, b) considering conversely any other relevant public policies which may be rendered ineffective or less effective by denial of the claim, and c) keeping in mind the possibility of overkill unless the law is applied with a due sense of proportionality. We are, after all, in the area of public policy.
Milligan. That reasoning would no longer be followed, and it seems likely that if the transfer had been gratuitous then the father would now be able to establish a beneficial interest under a resulting trust, especially given the attitude of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza towards Tribe v Tribe.
The father also argued that there was an express trust in his favour. Chadwick LJ rejected this claim due to a lack of evidence; Aldous LJ held that any agreement included illegal terms and so could not be relied upon; Mance LJ thought that the father would have to rely on the proof of the purpose of their agreement, which was not allowed. Yet had the father been able to produce a simple document recording the express trust, then this would have been sufficient to establish a trust without leading any evidence of illegality. It is clearly unsatisfactory for the outcome of cases to depend upon whether an 'untainted' document can be produced as an 'objective fact', and the distinction drawn between relying upon an agreement and relying upon a neutral fact seems to be very fine indeed. The outcome of the case is, prima facie, that the daughter is rewarded for her duplicitous behaviour. 139 As the Law Commission noted, 'it seems nonsensical that the courts might decide the outcome of the case by looking at selective pieces of the relevant evidence'. 140 Happily, Patel v Mirza suggests a different outcome would now be reached. 141 The court would take into account the purpose of the prohibition and a sense of proportionality, such that the father would now be able to claim an interest under a trust.
Patel v Mirza will also affect the law concerning constructive trusts, or at least common intention constructive trusts. In Tinsley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that the same result should be reached regardless of whether the claim is brought for a beneficial interest under a resulting trust or under a common intention constructive trust. 142 This view received some support from the Court of Appeal 143 prior to Patel v Mirza, but in some situations it would have been difficult to establish any agreement sufficient for a 'common intention' without leading evidence of illegality. 144 Following Patel v Mirza, such a formalistic approach is not required: courts can look at all the evidence and decide whether a party should be prevented from enforcing a beneficial interest due to the illegality. 145 It is now even less likely that a party will be unable to claim a beneficial interest under a common intention constructive trust because of an illegal transaction.
In any event, where the trust is created for an 'illegal consideration', it would appear that the trust is valid, not void, unless independently void because contrary to public policy. 146 Under the approach in Tinsley, it seemed likely that any beneficiary would be able to enforce the trust unless he or she needed to lead evidence of the illegality in order to establish his or
